Secularism Before Liberalism

Secularism before Liberalism: A History of Early Modern Natural Law

In this book project, I recover a long-neglected feature of late medieval and early modern natural law theory: the distinction between the “natural” and the “supernatural.” I argue that this distinction played a significant role in the history of political secularism by demarcating the boundary between civil and spiritual matters and justifying the co-autonomy of these two spheres. The book focuses on the theoretical innovations of four major thinkers: Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546), Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), and John Locke (1632-1704).

The project is motivated by two goals: (1) to recover the forgotten political meanings of the idea of natural law and (2) to understand the logic of theocracy. In keeping with the first motive, my book corrects a historical misrepresentation of early modern natural law theory. Scholars of natural law over the past century have proceeded on the assumption that natural law is best understood in relation to positive or civil law. On this view, natural law is the universal normative foundation by which the legitimacy of all positive law can be judged. While this framework has yielded important studies of human rights, private property, and international law, its exclusive focus on the natural-positive distinction has resulted in an impoverished view of the meaning and significance of natural law. I argue that modern theories of natural law can only be understood in relationship to supernatural law. First articulated by Aquinas, this dichotomy distinguishes two independent foundations of human law: natural reason and supernatural revelation. For Aquinas and his early modern heirs, natural reason was the foundation for the secular authority of the civil sovereign, while supernatural revelation was the foundation for the spiritual authority of the Church. The concept of natural law was thus integral to early modern arguments for the separation of civil and spiritual powers.

The second motive of the project is to bring to light the particular attractiveness of theocracy as a political philosophy and the related difficulty of defending political secularism. This aim is inspired by Max Weber’s observation that all political rule must incorporate religious elements in order to secure the obedience of citizens. Weber argues that in order to prevent citizens’ religious commitments from undermining their obedience to the state, the state must form a political alliance with the religious elites. Either the religious elites must ordain the secular rulers, or the secular rulers must co-opt the religious elites. On this view, political secularism undermines legitimacy by banishing religion from politics. The four thinkers examined in this book overturned this theocratic logic by founding the civil state on natural law. Because natural law was divine in its authority yet secular in its jurisdiction, it could reconcile religious citizens to the state without rendering the state spiritual in nature. In other words, natural law banished religion from politics without banishing the divine.